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S
BY GERALD A. CARLINO
The Great Moderation in Economic Volatility:
A  View from the States
Since the middle of the 1980s, 
growth of the U.S. economy appears 
to have become much more stable 
than it was in the preceding three 
decades. The magnitude of the de-
cline in volatility is substantial: For 
the nation, growth of output has been 
one-half and growth of employment 
two-thirds less volatile than they were 
in the 1960s and 1970s. An aspect of 
the change in volatility that has been 
largely unexplored is its manifestation 
at the sub-national level. Recently, 
economists have started to look at the 
volatility of employment growth at the 
state level. Studies have found that 
while all states shared in the decline, 
declines were more dramatic in some 
states than in others. 
What accounts for the decline in 
volatility for the nation and its states? 
The most common explanations for 
the increased stability and lower vola-
tility of the national economy include 
structural change in the form of better 
inventory control practices, improved 
monetary policy since the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, and good luck in the 
form of smaller shocks hitting the 
economy.1 But when accounting for 
the various sources of the increased 
economic stability, the national stud-
ies pay only modest attention to other 
types of structural changes that may 
have helped to lower volatility in 
general, such as deregulation of the 
banking industry, increased globaliza-
tion, fewer unionized workers, and a 
variety of demographic changes not 
considered in the national studies.  For 
example, banking deregulation in the 
1970s and 1980s may have contributed 
to lower volatility by allowing consum-
ers and firms to smooth spending over 
time. Importantly, financial deregula-
tion occurred at about the same time 
that monetary policy is believed to 
have improved. The national studies’ 
failure to take deregulation into ac-
count may have led to an overstate-
ment of monetary policy’s role in the 
great moderation.
Why is the decline in volatility 
important to policymakers? Reduced 
volatility of employment leads to less 
economic uncertainty confronting 
firms and households. Understanding 
the forces that govern the volatility 
of employment growth at the sub-
national level is important to both 
national and local policymakers, since 
volatility at the state and national lev-
els are closely related. At the national 
level, researchers have one observation 
(the nation) to gain insight into these 
forces. The advantage of using state 
data is that such data offer a much 
larger testing ground for conducting 
the analysis.
TAKING STOCK OF THE
GREAT MODERATION
Growth of the U.S. economy 
appears to have become much more 
stable since the middle of the 1980s 
1Economists use the term shocks to refer to 
unanticipated changes in economic variables. 
Examples include unanticipated changes in 
monetary and fiscal policy, extreme environ-
mental conditions, and events that alter the 
world price of energy.
ince the middle of the 1980s, economic 
growth in the U.S. has become much more 
stable than it was in the preceding three 
decades. And the magnitude of the decline 
is substantial. What accounts for the decline in volatility, 
and why is the decline important for policymakers? In
this article, Jerry Carlino discusses these questions and 
makes the case that using state-level data, rather than 
just national data, offers a much larger testing ground for 
analyzing the decline in economic volatility.relative to the preceding three de-
cades. A graph of the growth rate of 
employment in the U.S. depicts this 
increased stability. From the mid-1950s 
to the early 1980s, quarterly employ-
ment growth largely fluctuated in a 
range of around 2.0 percent to -1.5 
percent. Since the mid-1980s, however, 
employment growth has hovered in a 
much narrower range: from less than 1 
percent to about -0.5 percent (Figure 
1).
The volatility of employment 
growth can also be measured using the 
standard deviation, which shows how 
much employment growth moves up 
and down around its average value.2
By this measure, average volatility of 
U.S. employment growth fell from a 
bit under 1.0 percent during the early 
1960s to about 0.3 percent in 2005 
(Figure 2).  More specifically, volatil-
ity fell precipitously during the 1960s: 
from a high of 0.96 during the second 
quarter of 1962 to 0.31 during the 
fourth quarter of 1969. Beginning in 
the 1970s, employment growth volatil-
ity reversed its previously declining 
trend and nearly tripled. This rise in 
volatility coincides with the gener-
ally poor economic conditions of the 
1970s, during which time the economy 
experienced rising inflation and slow 
growth.  From the early 1980s on, 
however, volatility generally declined 
as economic performance improved 
relative to the 1970s. This is an impor-
tant period in that most studies have 
tried to account for increased eco-
nomic stability since the early 1980s.  
Despite the general decline since the 
mid-1980s, volatility temporarily in-
creased during the 1990-91 recession 
and the 2001 recession. Volatility fell 
FIGURE 2
Standard Deviation of Total
Employment Growth Volatility




























2 The data used in this article are quarterly from 
1961:1-2005:2.  The data were seasonally ad-
justed before computing our volatility measure.  
Volatility is measured as the standard deviation 
of employment growth over the previous 20 
quarters.3 See the article by Keith Sill for a discussion of 
the two views: a one-time break in volatility vs. 
a long-run gradual decline. While the various 
measures used to analyze volatility have dif-
fered from study to study, all studies find that 
volatility has declined since the mid-1980s.  In
this article we assume that 1984 represents 
the break date for each state, too.  Michael 
Owyang, Jeremy Piger, and Howard Wall report 
finding differences in both the break date and 
the magnitude of the reduction in volatility 
across individual states.  However, they did not 
examine whether the break date they found for 
any given state is significantly different from the 
break dates found for other states.  
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dramatically during the expansion in 
the 1990s, as it has during the current 
expansion.  
There is a debate among econo-
mists about whether the decline in 
volatility is best represented as a sud-
den one-time “break” around 1984 
as opposed to a more moderate long-
run decline in volatility over several 
decades. Casual inspection of Figure 
2 suggests that employment growth 
volatility fell sharply in the mid-1980s. 
The figure shows that volatility of em-
ployment growth fell from an average 
of around 0.7 percent in the mid-1980s 
to an average of about 0.3 percent 
in 2005. Using a variety of statistical 
methods, economists find evidence 
that a one-time drop, or break, in vola-
tility seems to have occurred around 
1984. Following this convention, we 
will look at the change in employment 
growth volatility at the state level be-
tween two periods: 1956 to 1983 and 
1984 to 2002.3
Table 1 shows that while all states 
shared in the decline, employment 
growth volatility declined much more 
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dramatically in some states than in 
others. The state with the largest post-
* Excluding Alaska and HawaiiFIGURE 3
Standard Deviation of
Employment Growth Volatility by Industry
war decline in employment growth 
volatility is West Virginia, which saw 
a drop of almost 76 percent.  The state 
with the smallest decline is New York, 
at about 9 percent, compared with a 
decline of about 44 percent nation-
ally. Looking at the three states in the 
Third Federal Reserve District, we find 
that Pennsylvania was among the top 
five states in terms of the decline in 
the state’s employment growth volatil-
ity, falling almost 60 percent.  The 
decline in employment growth volatil-
ity in New Jersey (about 15.3 percent) 
was well below the national average; 
in Delaware (about 38 percent), it was 
somewhat below the national average. 
In general, similar declines in the 
volatility of total employment growth 
occurred at about the same time in 
most major sectors. Figure 3 shows em-
ployment growth volatility by sector for 
the nation for our two periods: 1956 to 
1983 and 1984 to 2002.4  With the ex-
ception of the finance, insurance, and 
real estate (FIRE) sector, the figure 
shows more stable employment growth 
by sector in the later period than in 
the earlier one.   
Table 2 shows the decline in vola-
tility by state for two important sec-
tors: manufacturing and services.5 The 
state with the largest postwar decline 
in manufacturing employment growth 
volatility is Michigan, which experi-
enced a 66 percent drop, while South 
Dakota saw a 17 percent decline, the 
smallest among all states. Manufactur-
ing employment growth volatility fell 
56 percent in the nation.  
The change in employment 
growth volatility for services is not 
given for some states because of insuf-
ficient data in the earlier period. Since 
the table shows the decline in volatil-
ity between the earlier and the later 
period, a negative number for a state 
indicates that employment growth 
volatility increased in that state. While 
employment growth volatility in the 
services sector decreased a modest 
2.5 percent for the nation between 
the earlier and later period, there was 
substantial variation across states. The 
state with the largest decline in em-
ployment growth volatility in services 
was Kentucky, which experienced a 
drop of 64 percent. On the other hand, 
in Mississippi, employment growth 
volatility in services increased almost 
29 percent. Still, the vast majority 
of states for which data are available 
experienced declining volatility in 
their service sectors, as well as in other 
broad sectors. 
SEEKING SOURCES OF THE 
GREAT MODERATION 
Economists have offered a number 
of possible explanations for the decline 
in the U.S. economy’s volatility. These 
can be grouped under three broad 
headings: better policy, good luck, and 
structural change.
Better Policy. Economists have 
noted that improved monetary policy 
— the greater emphasis the Fed placed 
on controlling inflation in the Volcker-
Greenspan years — might have damp-
ened the effects of economic fluctua-
Percent
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4 Because of recent changes in the way indus-
tries are assigned to broad sectors, we do not 
have a consistent series by sector that extends 
back sufficiently through time.  Thus, our anal-
ysis at the sectoral level ends in 2002.  Since 
industrial reclassification did not affect aggre-
gate employment, the analysis using aggregate 
data extends through 2005. 
5Services include personal services, business 
services, educational services, and social and 
other services.  Services provided by finance, 
insurance, and real estate industries are includ-
ed in the FIRE sector.  While manufacturing’s 
share of national total employment has gone 
down over time, services’ share has increased.  
Taken together, manufacturing and services 
have accounted for roughly 40 percent of total 
national nonfarm employment since the 1950s.  
The remaining 60 percent of national nonfarm 
employment is accounted for by trade; govern-
ment; transportation, communication, and 
public utilities; mining; and construction.  
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New Hampshire 32.8 32.6
New Jersey 45.9 -5.0
New Mexico 35.1 39.6
New York 50.2 -2.7
North Carolina 43.0 18.7





Rhode Island 48.9 N/A
South Carolina 43.4 18.9








West Virginia 56.0 39.2
Wyoming 39.1 62.3
TABLE 2
Percent Decrease in Volatility:
1956-1983 to 1984-2002*
tions, leading to a more stable econ-
omy. According to Olivier Blanchard 
and John Simon, the volatility of 
output and the volatility of inflation 
have tended to display a strong positive 
correlation. Low and stable inflation 
makes economic planning easier and 
improves the functioning of markets.  
Stable inflation may contribute to 
more stability in the growth of output 
and employment.
In the pre-Volcker era, monetary 
policy was characterized as “accom-
modative” in that policymakers did not 
respond strongly enough to keep infla-
tionary pressures under control. The 
conduct of monetary policy appears to 
have changed significantly beginning 
in the Volcker era in an effort to bring 
high and rising inflation pressures un-
der control.6  A recent study by James 
Stock and Mark Watson shows that 
the increased stability of output and 
employment since the mid-1980s is 
partly due to monetary policymakers’ 
greater emphasis on inflation and their 
success at controlling it. In studying 
the various sources of the moderation 
in output volatility since the mid-
1980s, Stock and Watson find that 
better monetary policy since the early 
1980s accounts for about 20 percent 
of the decline in volatility.7 Still, Stock 
and Watson find that half the decline 
in volatility is unaccounted for and 
they attributed it to sheer luck. 
Good Luck.  The word “shock” 
represents economists’ shorthand for 
a factor or force that causes an unex-
6 Paul Volcker served as Chairman of the Feder-
al Reserve from 1979 to 1987.  Alan Greenspan, 
who succeeded Volcker, served as Chairman 
from 1987 to 2006. 
7Sylvain Leduc and Keith Sill also assessed the 
importance of monetary policy for the decline 
in U.S. output volatility that has occurred since 
the mid-1980s. They find that improved mon-
etary policy accounted for about 10 percent of 
the decline in real output volatility, half the size 
found by Stock and Watson. 
* Excluding Alaska and Hawaiipected change in an economic vari-
able, such as employment growth. Ex-
amples include weather-related events, 
strikes, and domestic and foreign po-
litical crises. To the extent that volatil-
ity is the result of large adverse shocks, 
it will decline if these unlucky events 
are smaller in magnitude or happen 
less frequently. Hurricanes and other 
weather-related events represent a type 
of shock that affects states differently. 
The damage done to Louisiana, Mis-
sissippi, and Alabama by Hurricane 
Katrina is an obvious case. As we have 
indicated, a substantial part of the 
decline in national volatility cannot be 
accounted for and may be due merely 
to good luck. Unfortunately, the good 
luck the economy has experienced 
since the mid-1980s may be temporary. 
If the bad luck the economy experi-
enced prior to the mid-1980s returns, 
economic volatility may increase. 
Structural Changes.  Many types 
of structural changes may have helped 
to lower the volatility of employment, 
such as the shift of jobs from manu-
facturing to services, better inventory 
management methods, fewer unionized 
workers, and banking deregulation.  
Redistribution of jobs. Perhaps the 
most intuitive explanation for the de-
cline in employment growth volatility 
in the mid-1980s involves the shift of 
employment from the relatively more 
volatile goods-producing sector to the 
relatively less volatile services sector. 
According to this view, manufactur-
ing contributed more to the decline 
in volatility than other sectors, both 
because manufacturing is a relatively 
high-volatility sector and because 
manufacturing’s share of employment 
has declined.8
Manufacturing’s share of total 
U.S. employment fell from an average 
of 27 percent between 1956 and 1983 
to an average of just over 16 percent 
between 1984 and 2002. At the same 
time, services’ share increased from 
an average of about 17 percent in the 
earlier period to an average of 27 per-
cent in the later period. In the earlier 
period, manufacturing employment 
growth was, on average, almost twice 
as volatile as employment growth in 
services. While manufacturing contin-
ues to be more volatile than services, 
the gap has narrowed substantially. In
the later period, manufacturing em-
ployment growth was, on average, only 
about 50 percent more volatile than 
was employment growth in services.  
Figure 4 shows the volatility of manu-
facturing employment growth relative
FIGURE 4
Ratio of Manufacturing to Services
Employment Volatility
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to the volatility of services employment 
growth. After declining for the better 
part of the 1960s, relative volatility 
increased somewhat between the late 
1960s and early 1970s, before increas-
ing dramatically in the period 1973 to 
1979. The jump in relative volatility 
is largely due to a jump in volatility in 
manufacturing. The disruption in oil 
supplies in the 1970s may have led to 
much greater volatility in manufactur-
ing than in services. Of importance for 
this article is the sharp drop in relative 
volatility since the mid-1980s, which 
is consistent with the observed sharp 
drop in the volatility of total employ-
ment growth.9
How much does the shift of jobs 
from the relatively high-volatility sec-











8Although volatility in the mining and con-
struction sectors fell more than volatility in the 
manufacturing sector, the share of employment 
in both the mining and the construction sectors 
accounts for at most about 6 percent of total 
U.S. employment. Given their relatively small 
share of total employment, these two sectors 
contribute very little to the decline in total 
employment volatility, despite the relatively 
large declines in volatility recorded by industries 
in these sectors.  
9 A couple of studies have found that energy 
price shocks since the mid-1980s have played 
virtually no role in accounting for the increased 
stability of the national economy.  See the ar-
ticle by Stock and Watson and the one by Leduc 
and Sill. tors to the relatively low-volatility sec-
tors matter in explaining the overall 
decline in employment growth volatil-
ity? To address this issue, we conduct-
ed an experiment in which we con-
structed a hypothetical series for total 
employment growth, holding each 
industry’s share of total employment 
fixed at its 1961 level. Since industry 
shares are held constant at their 1961 
levels over the period 1961 to 2002, all 
of the variability in the hypothetical 
series will be due to changing volatility 
in the various sectors.10 Figure 5 shows 
hypothetical volatility juxtaposed with 
actual volatility. The volatility of the 
hypothetical series is generally above 
that of the actual series. Still, the 
largest difference between the hypo-
thetical series and the actual series is 
in the 1970s and early 1980s. The dif-
ference between these two series was 
much narrower after 1984, suggesting 
that the shift of jobs away from manu-
facturing is not an important cause 
of the decline in volatility since the 
mid-1980s.  In fact, two recent studies 
using state-level data on volatility and 
a statistical technique called regression 
analysis find that the redistribution of 
jobs toward the less volatile sectors has 
played only a minor role in accounting 
for the decline in employment volatil-
ity observed since the mid-1980s.11
Better inventory management.
Some studies point to innovation in 
inventory management techniques 
(such as the explosion in information 
FIGURE 5
Hypothetical and Actual Volatility
in Total Employment Growth
Standard Deviation










technology and just-in-time production 
techniques) that have allowed firms to 
better use inventories to smooth pro-
duction and employment. For example, 
just-in-time inventory techniques al-
low producers to maintain lower stock 
levels and to better match production 
with sales. Changes in demand result 
in smaller swings (that is, less volatil-
ity) in production now than in past 
decades. Despite this theory’s appeal, 
the extent to which improved inven-
tory management methods have con-
tributed to increased stability is subject 
to some debate by economists and the 
question of its role is far from settled.12
Fewer unionized workers. Other 
types of structural changes, such as 
fewer unionized workers and increased 
globalization, may also have been at 
work, and these changes may have 
helped to lower volatility. For example, 
an important structural change is the 
sharp drop in the number of union 
members over the past 40 years. In
1964, almost 30 percent of workers 
were union members. By 1994, the 
share had fallen to less than 13 per-
cent. In fact, the decline in the share 
of unionized workers accelerated after 
1980. Between 1964 and 1980, the 
share of workers covered by unions 
fell about 1.3 percent per year, but the 
share fell about 1.8 percent per year 
between 1980 and 2004. The accelera-
tion in the decline of unionized work-
ers after 1980 may have contributed to 
the economy’s increased stability. 
Why might employment volatility 
decrease as the number of unionized 
workers decreases? Since unions are 
generally unwilling to accept decreases 
10 To construct the hypothetical series, employ-
ment growth rates for each major industry for 
each year were weighted by each industry’s 1961 
share of total employment. The hypothetical 
employment growth series was used to compute 
the hypothetical volatility (defined as the stan-
dard deviation of employment growth over the 
previous 20 quarters) shown in Figure 5.   
11 See my study with Robert DeFina and Keith 
Sill and the study by Owyang, Piger, and Wall 
for evidence on the role of the shift of jobs from 
manufacturing to services in explaining chang-
ing employment growth volatility. 
12 See the article by James Kahn, Margaret 
McConnell, and Gabriel Perez-Quiros for a 
discussion of the role of improved inventory 
management in the decline in economic volatil-
ity. The bulk of the research suggests little role 
for inventories in reducing volatility.  See the 
article by Keith Sill for a good review of the 
relevant studies.
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mand falls, unionized firms can adjust 
only by changing employment.  When 
demand improves, unionized firms 
rehire many of the same workers they 
laid off during bad times. These layoffs 
and subsequent rehires may induce 
greater volatility in employment 
growth than would have occurred if 
wages had borne more of the adjust-
ment to changing demand. But the 
decline in the share of unionized work-
ers occurred gradually, making it an 
unlikely explanation for the sharp drop 
in volatility we observe.
Banking deregulation.  An im-
portant type of structural change 
that began in the early 1980s was the 
deregulation of the banking industry. 
Until the 1980s, commercial banks 
in the U.S. faced restrictions on the 
interest rates they could pay depositors 
and charge borrowers. When market 
interest rates rose above the legal ceil-
ings that banks were allowed to pay 
for deposits, many depositors withdrew 
their funds from the banking system. 
This led to a drop in the amount of 
credit that banks could extend to firms 
and households, thereby hurting bank-
dependent borrowers.
Housing in the 1960s and 1970s 
was particularly hard hit when market 
interest rates rose above these interest 
rate ceilings. But once the ceilings 
were removed in the 1980s, banks 
and savings and loans were able to 
offer competitive interest rates to 
their depositors, thus preventing a 
wholesale withdrawal of deposits and 
allowing banks to continue to make 
construction and mortgage loans. 
In fact, economists Karen Dynan, 
Douglas Elmendorf, and Daniel Sichel 
show that there has been a substantial 
decline in the volatility of residential 
investment since the mid-1980s. 
Until the 1980s, banks also faced 
geographic limitations in that bank 
holding companies were not permitted 
to cross state borders. The geographic 
restrictions also made banks’ ability 
to lend more vulnerable to economic 
shocks that affected their own states. 
In the absence of a national banking 
system integrated across states, the al-
location of funds and the resulting dis-
tribution of money and credit can be 
uneven. That is, it can get "stuck" in a 
state, depending on where and how the 
deposit and withdrawal activity takes 
place. In this case, money and credit 
would flow less easily from one state to 
another in the face of a state shock.
Although banking markets tended 
to be local in nature prior to deregula-
tion, a bank in one state that needs 
money could borrow in national credit 
markets, such as the fed funds market 
(borrowing of funds overnight from 
other banks), through bank holding 
companies that issue commercial pa-
per to raise funds, and the Eurodollar 
market (deposits from banks outside 
the U.S.).  However, raising funds in 
these national and international mar-
kets imposed some additional costs on 
banks, and these costs may have lim-
ited banks’ willingness to raise funds 
from these sources.  
Today, most of these restric-
tions on commercial banks have been 
phased out.  Shocks to a state can be 
met with inflows or outflows of funds, 
and thus, the adjustment to the shock 
is likely to be smoother. In essence, 
deregulation made the banking system 
more efficient and, in the process, al-
lowed the financial sector to act more 
as a stabilizer for the real sector.  
A recent study by Donald Mor-
gan, Bertrand Rime, and Philip 
Strahan finds that state employment 
volatility fell substantially after inter-
state banking was permitted.13 States 
deregulated their banking sectors at 
different times. In 1978, Maine was the 
first state to pass a law that allowed 
entry by bank holding companies from 
any state that reciprocated by allow-
ing Maine banks to enter their bank-
ing markets.  Following Maine’s lead, 
states deregulated in waves, with the 
bulk of states approving legislation to 
allow deregulation between 1985 and 
1988. With the exception of Hawaii, 
all states allowed interstate banking 
by 1993. In their study, Morgan, Rime, 
and Strahan use the staggered timing 
in state-level action to relax interstate 
banking restrictions to explain some of 
the cross-state differences in employ-
ment growth volatility as well as the 
increased stability of state economies. 
They conclude that the increased 
stability following regulatory change 
made state economies much less sensi-
tive to the fortunes of their own banks.
The finding that interstate bank-
ing appears to have contributed to 
increased economic stability raises an 
Until the 1980s, banks also faced geographic 
limitations in that bank holding companies 
were not permitted to cross state borders.
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13 According to the theory developed in Mor-
gan, Rime, and Strahan’s study, it’s possible 
for volatility to rise, fall, or remain mostly 
unchanged following legislation that allowed 
interstate banking.  Deregulation’s net effect 
on employment growth volatility is, therefore, 
an empirical issue.  As indicated in the study 
by Morgan and co-authors, the net effect is, on 
balance, negative, suggesting that employment 
volatility became more stable after interstate 
banking was allowed than before such deregula-
tion.  For a discussion of why deregulation’s net 
effect on employment growth volatility might be 
positive, see the article by Philip Strahan.  important concern with Stock and 
Watson’s study, which attributed 20 
percent of reduced volatility since 
the mid-1980s to improved monetary 
policy. Since financial deregulation 
occurred at roughly the same time that 
monetary policy is supposed to have 
improved, it’s possible that the Fed did 
not make as substantial a contribution 
to increased stability as some believe; 
rather, banks were better able to imple-
ment monetary policy decisions follow-
ing deregulation. By not controlling 
for financial deregulation, Stock and 
Watson may have overstated monetary 
policy’s role in lowering volatility. 
Similarly, while Morgan and 
co-authors considered banking 
deregulation’s contribution to volatil-
ity, they did not adequately control 
for the role that improved monetary 
policy may have played. In their study, 
Morgan and co-authors account for 
the common or average effect of mon-
etary policy on state volatility. In an 
earlier Business Review article, Robert 
DeFina and I found that monetary 
policy affects economic activity in the 
states quite differently. It’s conceiv-
able that changes in the conduct of 
monetary policy may have contributed 
to substantial state-level deviations in 
the growth of employment volatility 
from the average effect measured by 
Morgan and co-authors. If the unac-
counted-for differences in the impact 
of monetary policy are correlated with 
the date at which states deregulated, 
Morgan and co-authors’ estimates of 
deregulation’s effect on the volatility of 
employment growth may be overstated. 
We believe there is evidence of such 
bias.14 To date, no study has accounted 
adequately for both forces — improved 
monetary policy and deregulation 
— simultaneously.  
CONCLUSION
The question of what generates 
volatility in employment growth at the 
state level is closely related to what 
generates volatility at the national lev-
el. Understanding the forces that gov-
ern employment growth volatility at 
the sub-national level is important to 
both national and local policymakers. 
While progress has been made in iden-
tifying some of the sources of the great 
moderation, there appear to be other 
forces at work that could improve our 
understanding of the increased stabil-
ity of local and national economies. 
While some studies have looked at the 
relative roles that the shift of jobs to 
services, better inventory management, 
better monetary policy, and financial 
deregulation have played in produc-
ing a more stable economy, no study 
has satisfactorily controlled for all of 
these forces simultaneously. Account-
ing for all of these forces together is an 
important next step to understanding 
the relative contributions these various 
forces may have individually played in 
explaining the great moderation.  
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14 States that tend to be more sensitive to mone-
tary policy actions might have deregulated ear-
lier than states that are less sensitive to policy 
actions in an attempt to smooth employment 
volatility in the more responsive states.  This 
would impart a negative correlation between 
the differential state responses to monetary 
policy action and the timing of banking deregu-
lation.  Using estimates of the differential state 
responses to monetary policy action reported in 
my paper with Robert DeFina, I found a nega-
tive (-0.278) and significant correlation between 
differential state responses to monetary policy 
action and the timing of banking deregulation.REFERENCES
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